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Abstract: Cargo shipping, as emblematic stand-in for globalization, peddles a 
seductive imagery of frictionless transnational trade and just-in-time logistics. 
Backed by the normative might of transnational institutions, instruments such as 
UNCTAD’s Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) are being rolled 
out across “developing countries,” promising the rationalization, acceleration, and 
“dematerialization” of customs processing, while countries themselves introduce 
effi  ciency reforms to smoothen the fl ow of goods. Th is article charts the inten-
sive work required to produce this fantasy of frictionless trade around the Atlantic 
port of Lobito, Angola. In a context where imports have dropped by 50 percent to 
60 percent since 2014 due to lower oil prices, this article traces how actors involved 
in making this import-dependent economy work deal with the seeming failure of 
promises of transnationally connected economic growth.
Keywords: Angola, ASYCUDA, crisis, customs, import-dependency, seaports, 
shipping
Frictionless global trade is both a precondition 
and an ideological foundation of what is com-
monly and ahistorically glossed as globalization. 
In this narrative, the increasingly cost-eff ective 
outsourcing and reallocation of manufacturing 
across the globe is a “win-win” situation that al-
lows “poorer countries” to play out their main 
competitive advantage—lower labor and pro-
duction costs—while reducing end consumer 
prices and increasing corporate profi ts through 
arbitrage (Cowen 2014: 58). In line with this 
theme section’s call to ethnographically investi-
gate the complex technological machinery and 
human labor required to move the goods along 
the maritime logistics chain, this article looks 
at the considerable work involved in producing 
and upholding this seductive imagery of fric-
tionless global trade.
More specifi cally, in the context of Angola, 
the article examines the tensions that arise from 
the gap between the promises by technical and 
regulatory reforms to facilitate customs decla-
rations and speed up maritime imports and the 
increasingly grim realities of a blocked import 
economy almost at a standstill. Focusing on the 
way importers, customs brokers (despachantes), 
and customs agents improvise to straddle the 
new effi  ciency imperatives of technical and regu-
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latory innovation amidst infl ation and dwindling 
foreign exchange reserves, this article charts the 
intensive labor required to make goods fl ow.
Indeed, for the container economies under 
scrutiny in this issue, the port of destination is, 
barring transshipment and cabotage, not only a 
physical port but most oft en also a port of en-
try into a national territory. For goods to move 
across the sea, someone has to order them, pay 
for their shipping, and receive them. However, 
to retrieve the goods from the port, they have 
to be cleared through customs. And this whole 
process—from order and payment to declara-
tion and clearance—presents substantial chal-
lenges to those who are working to bring the 
goods in.
Anthropological scholarship has cautioned 
us to see both “the national economy” and “the 
global economy” as ideological constructions, 
especially when renewed attention has been 
placed on the unreliability of macro-economic 
indicators in Africa (Jerven 2013). Following 
Hannah Appel, we need to ask ourselves how 
“national economies become both intelligible, 
possessing representational unity or natural-
ized authority, and compelling—the stuff  of fan-
tasy and desire, power and subjugation” (2017: 
295)—and the same kind of questions must be 
asked about “the global economy,” too.
My analysis is set in Lobito, on the Angolan 
central coast. Th e port of Lobito is, in compar-
ison with massive transshipment ports such as 
Algeciras (Leivestad, this issue), Singapore, or 
Santos, but a secondary port on the Southern 
Atlantic. Its historical importance and ongoing 
centrality to regional economic life and in ini-
tiatives designed to smoothen the business of 
imports in Angola, however, make it an apposite 
site to investigate the work-intensive production 
of seemingly frictionless circulation. Seaports at 
the margins are central to global projects of cir-
culation that, while claiming universal connec-
tivity, are “profoundly dependent on the uneven 
terrains of global capitalism” (Sten manns 2019: 
850).
Th e Angolan context can help us tease out 
this unevenness precisely because the business 
of imports in a context of crisis is fraught with 
so many frictions. Ports are oft en represented 
as “portals” or “nodes” of globalization or as 
“seamless bridges for fl ows” (Rothenberg 2018). 
As such, they are good to think with about what 
this global economy is and the substantial work 
that is required to make it appear as something 
given and coherent that just fl ows frictionless 
across borders and regulatory regimes.
Th is material is part of an ongoing research 
project seeking to disaggregate the commodity 
crisis and its impact on an import-dependent 
African economy such as Angola. It is based on 
interviews and observations carried out in Lo-
bito over fi ve months since May 2018, and in-
formed by my research in Angola since 2007. As 
such, the article is also a rejoinder to Ruy Llera 
Blanes’ thoughts about the “unnameability of 
austerity” in Angola in an earlier issue of Focaal 
(2019).
Aft er a discussion of supply chain capitalism 
and the role of states, specifi cally through ports 
and customs, I briefl y sketch out the Angolan 
context, detailing how political changes, cycles 
of resource-dependent boom and bust, and the 
more recent introduction of ASYCUDA, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and De-
velopment’s (UNCTAD) Automated System for 
Customs Data, have all profoundly reshaped the 
conditions for the business of maritime cargo. 
Th e article then ethnographically zooms in on 
the business of imports, fi rst from the perspec-
tive of food importers, then from the viewpoint 
of customs agents and customs brokers, to in-
vestigate how the relationship between global 
logistical dis/orders and sovereign compromises 
is reshaped through effi  ciency reforms and eco-
nomic crisis.
Th rough this, the article analyzes one of the 
key nodes of the maritime supply chain—the 
port of entry—and sketches out a larger argu-
ment about the seeming inescapability of the 
homogenizing ambitions of contemporary sup-
ply chain capitalism. Th e frictionless global con-
tainer economy, in this context, is revealed as a 
convenient fi ction that requires intensive work 
and improvisation. Th is includes strategies of 
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concealment and visibility that serve to uphold 
certain ideas as natural and self-evident, while 
obscuring other, less unambiguously “desirable” 
practices and outcomes that are equally neces-
sary to maintain the fl ow of goods.
States and supply chain capitalism
Representing transnational fl ows and the disap-
pearance of borders as a natural consequence of 
the increasing speed and connectivity brought 
about by “globalization” (Appadurai 1990; for 
a critique, see Heyman and Campbell 2009; or 
Rockefeller 2015), obscures both the individual 
agency and the complex regulatory architecture 
required to produce these fl ows. Yet this mis-
representation has become so dominant as to 
become almost unquestioningly believed and 
reproduced by a large public, including by pol-
iticians of all stripes across the globe (cf. Carse 
et al. 2020: 3).
However, as for example the UK parliament’s 
increasingly absurd convolutions over the “Irish 
Backstop” in 2019 showed, the free fl ow of 
goods is not a natural state of things. Barring 
elaborate regulatory frameworks such as a com-
mon market, ports of entry are “chokepoints” of 
national sovereignty (Dua 2018). Goods transi-
tion from one regulatory regime to another and 
are subjected to controls and duties. Actively 
challenging the “the neoliberal myth that cir-
culation is essentially born free but everywhere 
in chains” forces us “to render visible the many 
hands meddling in the world to make things 
move” (Schouten et al. 2019: 780).
Th e container as the box that made the logis-
tics revolution possible “marks not just the fetish 
of ‘network’ and ‘fl ow’ designs but moreover, its 
transductive value as a mediator of inputs and 
outputs” (Chu et al. 2020, see also Leivestad, this 
issue). However, despite the centrality of supply 
chain logistics to contemporary capitalism, the 
operations that move this box largely remain a 
black box. Research in critical logistics has sought 
to remedy this situation and to study logistics as 
a way to examine contemporary capitalism in all 
its unevenness. Indeed, “global circulation rests 
on a vast range of sociotechnical arrangements, 
relations and practices” that not only involve in-
ternational treaties and norms for technical har-
monization but are also “a matter of day-to-day 
work on recalcitrant people and objects” (Sten-
manns and Ouma 2015: 98), and ethnographic 
research especially has sought to center that day-
to-day work in its analysis. Soundly rejecting the 
fi eld of logistics’ “self-depiction as an apolitical 
science of circulation” (Chua et al. 2018: 625) 
and focusing instead on the inequalities, vio-
lence, and power disparities produced through 
supply chain capitalism, such scholarship has 
highlighted where and how states intervene 
strategically, and how state sovereignty has been 
reconfi gured and recast under the pressures and 
needs of the global supply chain.
As the interface between “the global” and na-
tional territories, customs services play a central 
role here. In the case of Ghana, Brenda Chal fi n 
has documented extensively how the customs 
standards, through processes of global harmoni-
zation, “emerge as key sites for the production of 
new criteria of statehood and new forms of sov-
ereignty” (2006: 243). Th ese processes Chalfi n 
sees as closely tied to the advance of neoliberal 
agendas. Similarly, for China, Julie Chu details 
how the imperative to facilitate export fl ows and 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) “has dra-
matically transformed customs from a marginal 
bureau of last resort, where the least competent 
state workers oft en ended up, to one of the most 
prominent and selective departments,” deeply 
aff ecting the professional and political subjec-
tivities of customs agents (2019: 203). Deborah 
Cowen (2010) elegantly describes the eff ects of 
the tension between geopolitical (read: inter-
national security) and logistical (read: the need 
for speed and seamless connections) models of 
spatial calculation on US institutions and policy 
making, while Julian Stenmanns applies a simi-
lar analytic on the “marginal” West African sea-
port of Freetown in Sierra Leone (2019).
Th e argument I advance here is that in “devel-
oping” countries—and especially African coun-
tries—scripted as corrupt and lacking the capac-
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ities to implement safety and security measures 
“correctly,” technical solutions and managerial 
governance reforms are viewed as a panacea 
for the ills that plague their ports and customs 
services. Th e case of Angola shows how such 
reforms can at the same time “fail” and be “suc-
cessful.” A reform such as the ones under scru-
tiny here might fail to fulfi ll its stated goals of 
smoothing the fl ows of imports—but as it “relies 
on and props up select sectors of the state appa-
ratus” (Chalfi n 2010: 575), it might still recon-
fi gure the state’s capacities and competences.1
Th e Angolan case, however, highlights that 
beyond the realm of state agents such as cus-
toms agents, a considerable amount of work is 
necessary to conceal the frictions between the 
ambitions of global free fl ows and messy socio-
political realities at the chokepoint—a sleight 
of hand that relies on strategies of visibility and 
invisibility to uphold certain ideas as natural 
and self-evident, precisely by occulting a host of 
other social practices that are equally necessary 
to keep the fl ow of goods coming. Producing 
and upholding this fi ction serves particular eco-
nomic and political interests, while conveniently 
obscuring histories of inequality, violence, and 
resource-dependency. And as Leivestad and 
Markkula discuss in their introduction to this 
theme section, the global shipping industry it-
self operates by this dual logic: speed and cost-
eff ectiveness conveniently eclipse more unsavory 
practices like fl ags of convenience, labor abuses, 
price dumping through arbitrage, and environ-
mental damage.
Reviving the Lobito Corridor
While neighboring Benguela, the capital of the 
eponymous province, had been a center of the 
Atlantic (slave) trade since the early 1600s, Lobito 
is very much the product of twentieth-century 
colonial extractive capitalism. Construction on 
the port started in 1903, soon followed by work 
to build a railway. Known by its Portuguese name 
Caminho de Ferro de Benguela as the CFB, its 
1,544-kilometer rail link stretched from the 
Atlantic coast to the country’s eastern border. 
By 1931, the CFB connected the port of Lobito 
with the mineral heartlands of Katanga in the 
Belgian Congo (today the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, DRC) and the (then Southern Rhode-
sian) Zambian Copperbelt (Duarte et al. 2015; 
Hance and van Dongen 1956).
From the start, the Lobito Corridor was 
geared toward bringing African raw materials to 
Europe’s industrial heartlands, an extractive logic 
replicated across the continent by colonial-era 
hinterland-to-coast rail corridors (Debrie and 
de Guio 2004: 22–23). Th e volume of goods mov-
ing through the port and railway grew steadily 
during the twentieth century, peaking in 1972—
manganese and copper from the neighboring 
countries, and iron, sisal, maize, wheat, bananas, 
and coff ee from the Angolan highlands. In ex-
change, consumer goods entered the port and 
were distributed inland.
Following a protracted, brutal anticolonial 
liberation war (1961–1974), independence in 
1975 was a watershed, as immediately aft er inde-
pendence Angola plunged into a civil war, which 
lasted, with some shorter interruptions, until 
2002. While the volume of transactions through 
the port and railway continued at a compara-
ble level till 1977, the combination of socialist 
planned economy and civil war soon led to a 
steep decline in exports. Cut off  from the hinter-
land, the government increasingly relied on the 
export of off shore oil to fi nance the war eff ort, 
producing the extreme oil-dependency that per-
sists until today.
An import-dependent container economy
From a port geared toward exports Lobito (and 
by extension Angola) shift ed to an import-
dependent container economy. Since the early 
1980s, “I have a container coming in” indexed 
an upturn in individual and collective fortunes, 
with imports not only the lifeline of the gov-
ernment-controlled parts of the country but 
also a ticket to personal advancement. With 
domestic agricultural and industrial production 
interrupted by the war, container shipping en-
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abled the import of essential goods and military 
equipment and of premium consumer goods 
for a small nomenklatura and oil expats—access 
to which could be bartered and exchanged for 
favors.2 Like elsewhere, containerization also 
reduced the footprint of the port in Lobitangan 
social life: previously sailors on shore leave for 
several nights enjoyed lively nightlife in bairro 
Canata, and local entrepreneurs had made for-
tunes in ship chandling; now ships stayed (ide-
ally) for a few hours at most, and insurance and 
security concerns prevented crew from leaving 
the port area.3
Aft er two decades in the doldrums, the end 
of the war in 2002 heralded the beginning of na-
tional reconstruction. Coinciding with the on-
set of a new commodity supercycle and growing 
demand from Asian countries, oil production 
expanded. With barrel prices at 60 to 110 USD 
for most of the decade and production around 
1.5 to 1.6 million barrels per day, Angola was 
fl ush with oil money. Contrary to many other 
African countries, Angola was able to rebuild 
on its own terms, without conditional donor 
assistance. Rehabilitating the CFB line and the 
port of Lobito was at the heart of the govern-
ment’s ambitious schemes, a prestige project to 
show the world that Angola could do things “on 
its own” and to diversify the national economy 
away from oil production (which still makes up 
90 percent of government revenue).
But while the port of Lobito aft er its upgrad-
ing boasts impressive, state-of-the art equip-
ment, there was, during the period of fi eldwork 
(2018–2019) almost no cargo coming in, much 
less going out. Th e little work was being carried 
out by the single multimodal crane, or the ships’ 
own cranes, as all but one of the new Chinese 
cranes procured by the government through oil-
for-infrastructures deals were standing still—
this fault was variously explained as being due 
to lack of maintenance, missing spares, corrup-
tion in the procurement process, or the general 
unreliability of the Angolan power grid.
Th e dry port was empty, despite having been 
inaugurated twice with great pomp ahead of 
elections by the former president, José Edu-
ardo dos Santos. Th e minerals terminal lay un-
used, and the promised new mineral exports 
from Katanga had only materialized at a much 
smaller scale than projected, owing to the defi -
cient rail network in DRC.
Figure . Largely empty quays. Photo by Jon Schubert, June 2019.
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Th is dismal state of aff airs, interlocutors 
agreed unanimously, was a result of the crisis—
a calamity that befell Angola in late 2014, when 
the price of a barrel of Brent crude oil dropped 
from about 110 USD to 62 USD, fl uctuating 
between 60 and 35 USD per barrel for most of 
2015 through 2017. With oil accounting for 90 
percent of exports and 75 percent of govern-
ment revenue, the country plunged into a deep 
recession: rising infl ation, a steep depreciation 
of the national currency, the kwanza, and the 
elimination of subsidies on fuel, hit the poorer 
parts of the population hardest. And despite a 
slight, temporary recovery of oil prices in 2018, 
the crisis has only deepened from 2018 to 2020: 
the population has no money, and a serious 
dollar shortage left  importers struggling to pay 
for their goods. Most of my interlocutors es-
timated that since 2014, the volume of goods 
imported had dropped between 50 percent and 
60 percent.
In the view of the Angolan government and 
the port of Lobito’s users, however, Lobito has 
the potential to become Angola’s most import-
ant port again, thanks to these multibillion-
dollar investments and the reestablished if un-
derutilized transborder rail link. Accordingly, 
hopes for economic development and measures 
to revitalize and diversify the economy also crys-
tallize around its shiny new installations. Its un-
used cranes and quays eerily empty of container 
stacks are stark reminders of the vulnerabili-
ties of container economies and the (localized) 
physical slowing down of global supply chains.
ASYCUDA in Lobito
Although the port of the capital, Luanda, re-
mains at the time of writing Angola’s biggest 
port in terms of volume, Lobito is still the poster 
child of Angolan port modernization. As such, 
it was chosen to serve, from early 2017 on, as 
the pilot project for the phased introduction of 
ASYCUDA to Angola.
ASYCUDA, the Automated System for Cus-
toms Data, is the United Nations Conference on 
Figure . Th e dry port was empty. Photo by Jon Schubert, June 2019.
70 | Jon Schubert
Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD) largest 
technical assistance program, and is currently 
being implemented in “over 90 countries, ter-
ritories and regions” (ASYCUDA n.d.). Th ough 
ASYCUDA is not a reform in itself, it is a tech-
nical tool designed to support and facilitate 
profound customs reforms to be negotiated 
between national authorities and UNCTAD 
(Cantens 2007: 290). Much as it is presented as 
technical assistance, ASYCUDA is but the lat-
est step in a longer process of global customs 
harmonization. Th is is a process that Brenda 
Chalfi n sees as both “closely tied to the ad-
vance of neoliberal economic agendas . . . [and] 
provide[s] a cover for shift s in the expression 
and location of state power on a global scale” 
(Chalfi n 2006: 243); Deborah Cowen places 
more emphasis on security imperatives and 
programs that “seek to govern integrated global 
economic space while at the same time retain-
ing politically diff erentiated sovereign territo-
ries (Cowen 2014: 81).
Couched in the technical language of “re-
moving barriers to trade,” UNCTAD reports 
operate on the basis of an aspirational, modern-
izing “but also” rhetoric. According to this logic, 
ASYCUDA serves as a panacea for “developing 
countries” that will not only “facilitat[e] trade 
effi  ciency and competitiveness by substantially 
reducing transaction time and costs”—argu-
ably its main goal—but also improve revenue 
collection, reduce corruption, increase security, 
and even promote “sustainable development by 
cutting down on the use of paper, through the 
use of electronic transactions and documents” 
(UNCTAD n.d.).
Figure 3. Porto de Lobito, 1928–2015: “87 years for Angola. A door to the future.” Jon Schubert, 
June 2019.
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A double, mutually benefi cial logic of vis-
ibility and concealment is at play here: on a 
transnational level, the touted benefi ts of cus-
toms rationalization occult the massively un-
equal terms of trade and resource-dependency 
that characterize African economies’ insertion 
into world markets (cf. Taylor 2016); at na-
tional level, it allows the Angolan government 
to enthusiastically embrace effi  ciency reforms 
that were visible to and well-received by inter-
national investors while eschewing more pro-
found structural reforms to its oil-dependent, 
rentier political economy.
Smoothing the fl ows of imports
Indeed, while Angola, thanks to oil money, 
largely eschewed the usual donor condition-
alities aft er the war, the government was very 
adroit in successfully positioning the country 
as a business-friendly and stable destination 
for FDI. Th is success owed more to the ready 
availability of vast sums of no-strings-attached 
oil money pouring into construction and bank-
ing than to eff ective reforms (cf. Ennes Ferreira 
and Soares de Oliveira 2019), but still: Angola 
was, until the downturn in oil prices, considered 
a stable, attractive destination for FDI, regard-
less of any possible democratic defi ciencies and 
human rights abuses. And some of this attrac-
tiveness was also a result of the government’s 
successful adoption of a language of market 
effi  ciency and embrace of managerial reforms 
to improve the “business environment” (this 
in itself oft en measured by proxy, such as the 
World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business” report 
and yearly rankings). Th is included the succes-
sive professionalization and modernization of 
the import regime.
In addition to the physical upgrading of the 
port of Lobito, new procedures and regulations 
to smoothen and accelerate the fl ow of imports 
were introduced. However, as the case of An-
gola highlights, there are serious limitations in 
simply implementing one-size-fi ts-all technical-
managerial “fi xes” to political and developmen-
tal issues.4 Let’s now fi rst turn to some of these 
new import regulations, then look at how ASY-
CUDA worked in greater detail.
Shift ing import regulations
“I have a headache with a vessel coming in,” Raafe 
the supply chain manager said, “the fi rst day you 
have to organize everything, the stevedores and 
the trucks, and there are always problems. Each 
additional day in port is twelve thousand dol-
lars in demurrage.5 For the stevedores, it’s more 
money, though.” We were sitting over espresso 
and bottled water in the Lobito offi  ces of one of 
Angola’s largest, Lebanese-owned food import-
ers,6 a company I will call LevantAngo.
LevantAngo established itself in Angola in 
the early 1990s with, as company lore has it, a 
single, maverick entrepreneur importing two 
containers of foodstuff s from his own savings. 
Now operating as subsidiary of the founder’s 
family holding in Geneva and Dubai, Levant-
Ango’s blue-and-white armazéns (warehouses) 
dominate the outskirts of all of Angola’s major 
towns, supplying Eritrean, Mauritanian, and 
Gambian wholesalers, as well as Angolan mar-
ket traders (cf. Inglês 2016: 223–224).
Raafe, was walking me through the steps of 
importing their supplies. To ensure constant 
levels of stores in LevantAngo’s armazéns, Raafe 
had to keep an eye on the whole supply chain, 
the “pipeline” of imports, as he termed it, and 
where delays could mess up his entire chain 
(cf. Rothenberg 2018). His headaches were not 
only linked to material challenges—such as the 
port’s faulty cranes, salary arrears among the 
workforce, fuel shortages aff ecting the whole 
province that led to stoppages at the truck-
ing companies, and the persistent pilfering of 
unloading straps for break bulk by the steve-
dores—rather, the whole administrative and 
regulatory environment in Angola seemed to 
conspire against Raafe to constrain the fl ow of 
imports.
Th e main problem, precisely, was regulatory 
and linked to the state’s reforms to improve the 
effi  ciency of imports and customs duty collec-
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tion. As Raafe complained, “Th e government 
takes a decision but makes no studies, no work—
we’re a test fi eld for them.” One of the key issues, 
he explained, was the introduction of import 
permits, almost overnight, and the withhold-
ing of import licenses for certain types of goods 
which, according to the ministries in charge, 
could be produced locally rather than imported: 
“Th ey take a decision, then they start noticing 
gaps. So we get a special permit.”
Political goals set by decision-makers oft en 
willfully misrecognize the actual challenges of 
bringing in the goods (cf. my previously men-
tioned Brexit parallel), creating endless compli-
cations for those actors involved in physically 
getting containers into the country. Between 
vaping breaks, Raafe’s offi  ce mate, Baqil, the 
commercial director for the Southern region 
reinforced:
Th ey introduce new laws all the time. For 
example, fuba, maize fl our, which is really 
essential to people’s diet here, we’re no 
longer allowed to import. [JS: And does 
the local production supply enough for 
the needs of the market?] No, they don’t 
supply enough. Th ey seek to be self-suffi  -
cient, but there’s not enough production. 
Th e government has the right vision, but 
there’s not enough foreign currency, no 
stable budget—the laws are good in prin-
ciple, but they’re passed and applied next 
Monday, and we have no stocks.
Another consequence of the crisis that directly 
impacted the way in which imports were orga-
nized was the introduction of letters of credit. 
Previously, importers could get dollars from 
their bank to pay their suppliers abroad, but af-
ter the oil price dropped in 2014, Angolan banks 
ran out of dollars when the National Bank of 
Angola (BNA) imposed stringent currency con-
trols and restricted dollar sales to commercial 
banks. As a consequence, importers were sit-
ting on mountains of kwanzas useless to import 
goods. Raafe and his colleagues were relatively 
lucky, as their holding company took a gamble 
and advanced the money to pay the suppliers.
Th e major government reform to ease the 
situation was to introduce letters of credit, 
whereby the bank endorses the importer’s pur-
chase. But, as Baqil explained, the plummeting 
Figure . Controlling the “pipeline,” Raafe’s offi  ce. Photo by Jon Schubert, May 2019.
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value of kwanza made this very unpredictable, 
as between the moment that the bank issues 
the letter of credit and the moment it charges 
the importer for the dollar amount in kwanza, 
the kwanza will usually have lost value again: 
“When the kwanza is at 326 today, they’ll issue 
the letter of credit based on that, but when the 
kwanza rises to 340 aft er three days, the bank 
will take more.” Sure, importers could factor in 
a 5 percent buff er to compensate for that, “but 
still you’ll have a surprise at the close of the year. 
In February [i.e., when the accounts are done] 
you’ll see that most of the profi t from the pre-
vious year is gone because of devaluation.” Th e 
result of this, my Lebanese friends told me, is 
that consumer end prices have doubled, if not 
tripled since the onset of the crisis, while most 
wages have nominally remained the same.
Importers such as Raafe may well seek to 
control the smooth unfurling of the maritime 
supply chain through space and time (cf. Roth-
enberg 2018); customs agents may even actively 
support the business of speedy imports by re-
ducing “unnecessary” inspections of low-risk 
goods (Chu 2019: 205)—crisis and oil-depen-
dency, as in the case of Angola, seriously call 
into question the idea of an “all-seeing state” 
à la Chalfi n, projecting its sovereign authority 
outward in time and space through a series of 
“spatio-temporal maneuvers” (Chalfi n 2007: 
1616). Rather, “the state” appears as a bricolage, 
an assemblage of contradictory impulses, inter-
ests, and capacities that is oft en more precarious 
than its sleek unitary façade projects.
Dematerializing customs clearance
Faced with such unpredictability, one might 
imagine that the introduction of ASYCUDA, 
with all its promises of smoothing the fl ows, 
would somewhat mitigate against these diffi  -
culties. However, Angola operates a regime of 
customs clearance inherited from the colonial 
regime, giving customs brokers/clearing agents 
(despachantes) a central role in clearing goods 
through customs. Much like lawyers represent 
their clients in court, customs brokers are inde-
pendent, liberal professionals, admitted to the 
profession by a state examination, and habili-
tated to represent their clients before the cus-
toms authority. Th e main task of the despachante 
is to interpret the customs code on behalf of his 
or her client, submit a truthful declaration to 
the customs authority, act as intermediary for 
the payment of duties, and transmit the customs 
clearance to the client, who can then retrieve the 
goods from port.
According to Dr Kalissala, who was a pro-
vincial department head at the AGT (Admin-
istração Geral Tributária, i.e., general customs 
and taxes authority), the introduction of ASY-
CUDA was a great success and a point of pride 
for the AGT delegation in Lobito. For him, the 
new system sped up things considerably, as it 
did away with the need for despachantes to 
physically submit the paperwork to AGT.
Th e system also automatically categorizes 
merchandises into risk categories, based on the 
type of good, the country of origin, and the 
track record of the importer (i.e., whether they 
are to be trusted or not; cf. Cowen 2014: 87), 
and fl ags up those containers that need to be 
documentarily or physically inspected. Th e sys-
tem also allows for the sharing of information 
between ports of entry across the national terri-
tory. Before that, Angola had already undergone 
a thorough customs reform, when its customs 
service had been largely managed by the Brit-
ish development consultancy Crown Agents. 
Th ese had introduced yet another system, TIMS 
(Trade Information Management System), to 
Angola while implementing sweeping reforms 
to curb corruption and ineffi  ciency.
For despachantes ASYCUDA did indeed speed 
up and “dematerialize” the process. In practice, 
however, the factors that created a headache for 
Raafe, also complicated life for the despachantes 
I spent time with. On a muggy Th ursday aft er-
noon, my friend Milton, an adjutant despachante 
running the business for a senior but largely 
absentee broker, invited me to accompany the 
clearance of a cargo in his offi  ce. He motioned 
me to sit down next to Dona (Mrs.) Elena, who 
did the preliminary work. Dona Elena launched 
74 | Jon Schubert
ASYCUDA World—an internet explorer short-
cut—and started explaining the system of registry 
numbers and category classifi cations. However, 
despite her repeated attempts, a pop-up window 
on the screen kept informing us that the system 
was unable to launch, as internet was down. 
And so, there was nothing much to be done for 
the rest of the day. Dona Elena packed up her 
things and suggested I came back to resume 
work the next morning.
Th e next morning, the system was up and run-
ning again, and Dona Elena walked me through 
a relatively simple despacho (declaration), the 
import of one container of iron sheets. Th is was 
easy, as it was one volume and one single cate-
gory of goods, and within about 40 minutes, she 
had fi lled in and ticked all the required boxes 
in the online platform and made it ready for a 
fi nal check by Milton. Meanwhile, her colleague 
at the desk in front of us had watched most of 
Godzilla and extensively browsed Facebook.
Milton’s responsibility was to double-check 
what assistants like Dona Elena had fi lled in, 
especially regarding the classifi cation of the 
goods, then attach the relevant documents to 
the fi le, and submit it to the AGT. Upon sub-
mission, the system automatically emits a nota 
de liquidação, a payment order for the customs 
broker to pay for customs and port fees on be-
half of their client. As such, Milton agreed, 
ASYCUDA had brought about an economia pro-
cessual, an economy of process, and simplifi ed 
their lives. Rather than having to compute the 
percentages by hand and insert them into the 
old style, A3 forms with oversized typewriters, 
the system did most of that work automatically.
And yet, despite such an economy of process 
at the level of the clearing agents’ offi  ces and their 
direct interactions with the AGT, one can hardly 
speak of a “dematerialized” and frictionless fl ow 
of imports. Due to the dearth of imports and 
the vicissitudes of an unreliable IT architecture, 
Milton in fact oft en had time to break for coff ee 
and pastries or go for drives across town to sort 
out all other kinds of private issues during his 
regular work hours. On one of these drives, as 
he was taking his wife, Cláudia, a customs agent, 
to a medical appointment up on the hill, they 
both reminisced about TIMS. Cláudia sighed: 
“I wish we’d kept TIMS. ASYCUDA is a good 
system but it’s not adapted to Angolan realities.” 
Milton continued: “You need really stable inter-
net for this. And here we know how oft en ‘there 
is no system’ (cf. Schubert 2017: 4, 113). Yeah, 
someone can slack off  and then tell his boss that 
there was no system, and what can a superior 
say? Th ere’s so oft en no system.”
In addition to these previously mentioned 
material challenges to implementing ASYCUDA, 
producing a “modern” and effi  cient system of 
customs clearance to insert Lobito into the mar-
itime supply chain requires adhesion to global 
standards of “good governance.” Th ese include 
technical practices and machineries, as well as 
security protocols devised to minimize the risks 
of smuggling, stowaways, and potential terror-
ist attacks to destination ports in the Global 
North (cf. Stenmanns 2019: 858). A modern, 
effi  cient customs service, holding itself to such 
global standards, should then by defi nition be 
Figure . At a despachante’s offi  ce. Photo by 
Jon Schubert, May 2018.
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clearly separated from the messiness of social 
life that surrounds it, so as to avoid corruption 
that would undermine safety, security, and due 
process.7 Both safety concerns and represent-
ing the free market as the most rational and 
effi  cient form of organizing exchange require 
strict, hygienic separation between agents of 
state bureaucracy and the self-interested actors 
of business.
Th e case of a customs agent married to a cus-
toms broker is but one, if rather obvious, exam-
ple of how tenuous this separation is. In a small 
town like Lobito, it becomes more easily evident 
how most actors involved in the business of im-
ports are intimately intermingled—sometimes 
connected through amorous or kinship ties or 
by having frequented the same high school, very 
oft en also by affi  liation to the ruling party—but 
that is also true in more “developed” contexts 
(cf. Chu 2019: 207; Leivestad, this issue). Fur-
thermore, in Angola, people oft en have to sup-
plement their formal but insuffi  cient wages with 
a side hustle or two that inevitably brings them 
in contact outside the formal procedures of a by-
the-letter despacho. Th is reveals how porous the 
boundaries are between the realms of the regu-
latory state and the regulated importer. Modern, 
“dematerialized” customs clearance is presented 
as the rational, effi  cient way to speed up im-
ports; inconsistencies and arbitrary-seeming 
changes to the import regime require constant 
improvisation and the mobilization of personal 
connections (Schubert 2019) to deal with bot-
tlenecks and constrictions to the fl ow of goods.
Concluding thoughts
Representing capitalism as the natural state of 
things relies on elaborate practices of conceal-
ment and revealing—concealing certain risks 
while pricing others, for example (Mannov, 
this issue), or, on a grander, more totalizing 
scale, presenting trade as an exchange “that 
makes everyone better off ” while concealing 
the fundamental violence of exploitation and 
dispossession.
Given everyday challenges, such as a plum-
meting kwanza and falling wages, unreliable in-
ternet, and ever-changing rules and regulations, 
smoothing the fl ow of imports in Lobito is hard 
work, requiring constant improvisation. And 
while the eff ects of these complications are di-
rectly felt in Lobito itself, where consumer end 
prices have been rising steadily since 2015, bot-
tlenecks at the chokepoint reverberate along the 
entire maritime supply chain.
In the form of ASYCUDA, a technical fi x to 
reconcile the contradictory imperatives of fric-
tionless fl ow and improved control and security 
is being rolled out across the “developing world,” 
backed by the normative might of the United 
Nations’ technical development assistance body, 
UNCTAD. Designed to remove the last remain-
ing obstacles to frictionless trade across Africa, 
managerial, technological fi xes, such as the elec-
tronic submission and processing of customs 
declarations promise to insulate actors of sup-
ply chain capitalism against “less aseptic—and 
more pernicious—political incentives” (Hönke 
and Cuesta-Fernandez 2018: 254).
Th e Angolan government’s uneven, seem-
ingly haphazard reforms to accelerate and facili-
tate the business of imports as seen through the 
lens of Lobito exemplify how precarious such 
fi xes are: while the idea of frictionless global 
cargo fl ows has indeed become so dominant as 
to become naturalized even among socialist-
trained public functionaries, realizing its prom-
ises is far from natural or self-evident. Despite 
the promises of dematerialization held up, mi-
rage-like, by technical fi xes such as ASYCUDA 
along the supply chain, a situation like Angola’s 
invites us to pay renewed attention to the mate-
riality of the fl ow of goods and to the possibili-
ties and unexpected social fi xes that open up at 
“sites of its coagulation” (Chua 2014).
In this secondary port city on the Southern 
Atlantic, the state-owned and state-managed 
port of Lobito was recently revamped. A cum-
bersome state bureaucracy has introduced seem-
ingly haphazard reforms. Th e dearth of foreign 
exchange produces a “challenging economic cli-
mate.” All these factors appear adverse to “the 
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market’s needs” and requirements for effi  ciency 
and speed, making the work of maritime im-
ports particularly complicated. Keeping the 
goods fl owing, especially in a context of crisis, 
requires constant improvisation, a healthy mea-
sure of fatalism, and the active cultivation of 
social ties across supposedly impermeable sep-
arations between “apolitical,” technical services 
and “self-interested” commercial actors. Up-
holding the fi ction of frictionless global trade 
requires, at every waypoint of the container 
economy, substantial ideological, political, af-
fective,8 and practical work.
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 1. I develop a similar line of reasoning about the 
co-production of sovereignty in greater detail for 
the mining sector in Mozambique in Schubert 
(2018).
 2. I discuss these bartering practices in greater de-
tail in Schubert (2017: 124); see also Auerbach 
(2020: 19).
 3. As discussed by Johanna Markkula and illus-
trated by the fi tter’s lament opening her article 
(this issue).
 4. Agathe Mora (2020) describes very similar in-
herent contradictions at play in rule of law re-
forms implemented by international bodies in 
postwar Kosovo.
 5. Charges for exceeding the contractually agreed 
lay time in port.
 6. Technically, of FMCG, Fast-Moving Consumer 
Goods sold in bulk and with a very small mar-
gin of profi t on large volumes, including durable 
food and beverage basics but also soap, washing 
powder, household detergents, and healthcare 
products like toothpaste.
 7. Th is is, by the way, why in many countries, 
customs agents are organised in corps that reg-
ularly rotate location, precisely to prevent too 
much familiarity with local social networks.
 8. On aff ective work, see especially also Mannov, 
and Markkula (both this issue).
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